Abstract: Studies of Chinese soft power have emphasized its potential to ameliorate the security C W important alternative Chinese interpretation of soft power as a response to domestic security challenges.
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"
-optive means of framing the agenda, N 20-21), is a popular concept in China. The term C the official lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). C ainternational media presence, pursuing foreign policies designed to improve its image as a responsible C C economic success has attracted internationally (see Zhang, 2012, pp. 623-626) . Chinese officials appear to be most comfortable discussing soft power strategy in the context of culture, however, and often T P recent cultural reform policies, which it claims are necessary to achieve what Chinese President X J C D rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, are in part motivated by the desire to increase soft power (see CCP Central Committee, 2011). I X J C D C quest for soft power (see Callahan, 2015) .
At the same time, the topic of soft power has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars studying C international relations. Some researchers have attempted broad assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of China C Jeong, 2008; Ding, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2006; Huang and Ding, 2006) . Others have examined the intellectual history of the concept in China and explain how it has been reinterpreted (Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Li, 2009) or its relationship with other Chinese ideas about foreign relations, such as public diplomacy (Wang, 2008) or foreign propaganda (Edney, 2012) . Some have examined case studies of Chinese soft power policy areas or initiatives (Ding and Saunders, 2006; Paradise, 2009 ) C bilateral or regional relations (Shen and Taylor, 2012; Hall and Smith, 2013) .
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Amid this proliferation of research into Chinese soft power a common consensus has emerged that the C security dilemma generated by C " C U " C that might trigger containment or balancing behavior. This approach is useful because it highlights an important reason why the concept of soft power has been embraced by the Chinese leadership even more than in its intellectual home of the United States. By focusing on foreign policy and emphasizing the security dilemma, however, this national security approach overlooks the relationship between soft CCP . Although previous studies have noted that in China soft power has a relevance to domestic politics that is not N of the concept (Barr, 2012, p. 82; Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 20; Li, 2009, p. 28) and scholars have pointed out serious C h as governance problems, D 73; Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 430) , the relationship between regime security and soft power in China is yet to be explored. This article aims to address this omission and in doing so contribute toward building a more complete view of the sources of insecurity shaping China soft power than is provided by a sole focus on national security and the security dilemma.
The article begins by defining regime security and explaining the conceptual relationship between soft power and regime security, with particular reference to legitimacy and national cohesion in China. It then examines the discourse wenhua anquan) in China to demonstrate that Chinese analysts are indeed applying the concept of soft power not only to national security but also to regime security concerns. In particular, the way that soft power has been applied to the realm of cultural security in China problematiz N A C mutually reinforcing (Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22 ). The conclusion 4 emphasizes the importance of taking regime security into account when investigating soft power beyond the liberal democratic West.
National security, regime security, and soft power
The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China (Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013) . This kind of national security perspective on Chinese soft power helps explain why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China's soft power project. as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15) , two important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and lack of national cohesion.
For a political authority such as the CCP, legitimacy is determined by the degree to wh (Gilley, 2009, p. 11) . In other words, the use of power must proceed according to rules, these rules are justified by widely shared beliefs, and the actions of those in subordinate positions provide evidence that they consent to the power relationship (Beetham, 1991, p. 16) . There has been a great deal of elite discussion of Party legitimacy in China, particularly since the early 2000s; one study showed that 68% of C CCP threat, while 30% claimed the Party faced a legitimacy crisis (Gilley and Holbig, 2009, p. 343) , and a more recent study found that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about regime legitimacy in China than their Western counterparts (Zeng, 2014) . For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to resolve the question of whether or not the CCP currently faces a legitimacy crisis, however, only to show that the potential for the party-state to lose its legitimacy is a serious source of insecurity.
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The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 2014, provides clear evidence that senior Party officials are highly concerned about the legality CCP T P P yi fa zhi guo P e according to the law it must first rule according to the constitution (Xinhua, 2014) . Responsibility for the justification of Party power falls on the Central Propaganda Department, which utilizes a comprehensive network of institutions to attempt to reproduce the official discourse justifying CCP rule and suppress any rival discourses that might challenge it (see Edney, 2014) . Lack of consent is also a problem that requires significant resources to overcome. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in recent years the annual number of major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 (Huang, 2012) . While all states use domestic force to
demonstrates that the lack of consent to CCP rule is widespread enough to be a cause for serious concern.
Soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction that is associated with a rise in soft power makes it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the truth of its claim , where status is defined not only in terms of material capabilities but also in terms of social recognition. For the most part, evidence of an increase in international recognition and attraction could be used to bolster claims that the regime has , regardless of whether soft power is a result of attraction to political values, culture, or foreign policies, or whether it is generated by the policies of the regime or sources within broader society. Some internationally attractive cultural 7 products can also be the work of dissidents or relate to aspects of culture or values that the regime would rather suppress, however, and these sources of attraction are difficult for the authorities to exploit.
Chinese political elites feel a keen sense of obligation to restore the coun great-power status (Deng, 2008, pp. 8-9) and show its people that China is globally respected and admired (Zhang, 2012, p. 620 (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 26-27) . This makes it easier for the CCP to claim legitimacy based on its success in moving China
Although national cohesion is a concept that is rather nebulous and difficult to assess, the regular references to cohesion in official CCP statements indicate that Chinese leaders are worried about cohesion and seek to improve it (e.g. CCP Central Committee 2011 , 2013 . As China has become a more plural society, generating social consensus (ningju gongshi) and unifying the people (ningju renxin) have become serious concerns for the propaganda authorities (Edney, 2014) . According to propaganda chief Xinhua, 2013) , while an early article on national cultural security published on a CCP website argues that if a country lacks cohesion even if it is strong in terms of other forms of 8 power when it faces challenges such as a natural disaster or foreign invasion it will bu kan yi ji) (Yang, 2006) . A lack of national cohesion can be a persistent problem for weak states that are unable to generate the large-scale use (Buzan, 1983, p. 67) .
Normally soft power refers to To consider the possibility that soft power could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the concept of soft power to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense the soft power of the political, social, and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the authorities at the center. Although this might seem to be a major step away from the traditional interpretation of soft power, N (2011, p. 19-20) argument that soft power is a key requirement of an effective counter-insurgency strategy and that dealing with the threat of terrorism requires the soft power of an appealing narrative that can win over mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting new members to their groups highlights potential significance for state efforts to respond to domestic sources of instability. In this case soft power involves enhancing regime security by making it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain material support from the local population, which then makes it easier for the state to deal with the security threat they pose.
The authorities in Beijing face a range of threats to national cohesion from peripheral regions, including the ongoing problem of terrorism and insurgent attacks in Xinjiang, protests and discontent in Tibet, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and de facto independence in Taiwan. In light of these challenges it would not be unreasonable for scholars or even the authorities to interpret the concept of soft power 9 as something that could also be applied to improve regime security by enhancing the cohesion between the political, social, and cultural core of the Chinese polity and those on the margins. Indeed, in more general terms, Wang and Lu (2008, p. 427) 
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The policymaking process in China is largely opaque and it is not generally possible to discern the relationship between academic discussions of a topic and official policy. It is not uncommon, however, for top leaders to raise the importance of a particular concept without specifying its exact meaning and for the scholarly community to then attempt to define or analyze the concept in greater depth. This appears to be what has happened in the case of cultural security. During 2011-12, the period leading up to and just after the Sixth Plenum, 37 academic journal articles with cultural security (wenhua anquan)
in their title appeared in the politics, military affairs, and law section of the CNKI database, which was more than the total number of similar articles for the years 1999-2009. Although the views expressed in such articles cannot be considered an indication of official policy, they can help to clarify the scope of debate and highlight common assumptions surrounding a concept such as cultural security.
The Sixth Plenum, which focused specifically on the issue of cultural system reform, noted that the need to protect national cultural security is an important task that is becoming more difficult (CCP Central
global ideological and cultural struggle, it is increasingly urgent to strengthen national cultural capabilities and international competitiveness, to resist the cultural infiltration of foreign hostile forces,
term has appeared not only in official documents related to culture, however, but also in documents The cultural development element of cultural security involves ensuring that Chinese culture remains vibrant and becomes more internationally influential, while defending against the threat of cultural F scholar Guo Caihua notes that although external th overlooked when assessing threats to cultural security (Guo, 2013, p. 14) . Another academic assessment of cultural security identifies weaknesses in Marxism and mainstream ideology as well as problems with national cultural development, such as cultural stagnation, lack of cultural innovation, and a lack of ability to transmit Chinese cultural products to the world (Han, 2004, pp. 12-13) . As part of its section on speeding up mechanisms for reform and innovation in the cultural system, the 12th Five Year Plan includes a paragraph on developing a system of cultural management, where it refers to the need to anagement of the cultural market, that ideology provides the cultural basis for the legitimacy of state power and that national culture is also a source of legitimacy and national cohesion, therefore problems in either of these areas could spark a national crisis (2004, pp. 9-10).
Soft power and cultural security
In his own work and in collaboration with the Chinese scholar Wang Jisi, Nye claims that American and Chinese soft power does not have to be a zero-sum competition and can instead be mutually reinforcing (Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22 China and the United States can become more attractive to each other through the mutual growth of soft power then this will reduce the potential for conflict between them. If we only focus on national security and the security dilemma this argument seems sensible because if each side becomes more hen this will lead to a growth in shared interests and greater cooperation to solve international problems; an increase in the soft power of one does not pose a threat to the other in the same way that an increase in military capabilities might. When we consider the way that Chinese scholars have applied the concept of soft power to the problem of cultural security, however, this mutual attraction scenario becomes more problematic.
Although Chinese analysts do not generally identify a direct link between the threat of foreign soft power and the potential for the CCP to lose its legitimacy, their references to the undermining of socialist ideology, values, and national cohesion make it clear that they are concerned that certain Indeed, for many analysts, responding to cultural security threats involves a strategy that looks C power, albeit one with particular Chinese characteristics.
For example, Zhang and Lao (2011) argue for the need to maintain cultural security by strengthening Chinese culture rather than by limiting cultural interaction between the West and China. In addition to exhortations to maintain a cultural development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, build a us on the need to increase cultural creativity to make Chinese culture more progressive, the need to move from being a country that is rich in cultural resources to one that is also strong in terms of cultural production, and the need to come up with creative ways for Chinese culture to reach the rest of the world.
M C
influence but tend to place greater weight on strengthening the domestic sources of national cohesion and legitimacy. For example, Jiang puts forward three suggestions for how China can make use of its soft W C F most important task is to build a socialist core value system, which will help unify different groups within society by increasing the attractiveness and cohesive power of socialist ideology; second, culture (which Jiang equates with socialism); third, implement a cultural security strategy based on developing the country, because for Jiang the soft power of culture ultimately relies on the support of political, economic, and military hard power (Jiang, 2010, pp. 90-91) . Jia Youjun argues that the key to Cambridge University Press. Rowman and Littlefield. 
